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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Appellant has failed to comply with its obligation to adequately marshal all of the 
evidence supporting all of the Trial Court's decision in this case. For this reason, the 
Appellee is reciting and expanding the relevant facts to demonstrate the correctness of the 
Trial Court's award in favor of the Appellee. 
In September 1998, American Housing Partners, Inc. ("American"), an experienced 
real estate developer, entered into a contract to purchase real property in West Jordan, Utah 
(the "Property") from a group of sellers (the "Coon Group"). (R. 231, 235; R. 408: Tr. 19; 
Ex. No. 30.) Armando Alvarez ("Alvarez"), a licensed real estate broker, handled all 
transactions for American, which is owned by Alvarez's brother. (R. 408: Tr. 9-10.) 
American's contract required closing within 120 days. American applied for a zoning change 
with the City of West Jordan, intending to subdivide and develop the Property, and to sell the 
lots. (R. 408: Tr. 19-20.) Alvarez expected City approval to be obtained within the 120-day 
time period under the contract with the LaMar Coon Group. (R. 408: Tr. 46.) 
Prior to August 1999, Alvarez and American had prior dealings with Jim Fairbourn 
("Jim"), of Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. ("Fairbourn Commercial"), involving Jim's 
representation of sellers in several transactions. (R. 409: Tr. 303-304.) Starting about 
January 1999, Alvarez and Jim discussed the Property in general terms, with the discussions 
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anticipating the possibility of Fairbourn Commercial listing the future sale of lots in the 
Property for American. (R. 408: Tr. 52; R. 409: 305.) 
Because of delay in City approval, the Coon Group and American signed an 
Addendum to the sales contract extending the closing date until April 15,1999, and requiring 
American to deposit an additional $10,000.00 with the escrow agent by March 15, 1999. 
(R. 408: Tr. 48; Ex. No. 32.) American did not make that deposit. Furthermore, the City 
denied the zoning application in April 1999. (Ex. No. 54.) 
Frustrated with the problems surrounding the Property, Alvarez in June or July 1999, 
asked Jim if Jim could find a buyer for the entire Property because of Alvarez's frustrations 
with the City. (R. 408: Tr. 53.) Those parties discussed various ways to sell, including Jim's 
suggestion that the Property could be sold as "paper lots," which Alvarez had not sold before 
(R. 408: Tr. 53, 54; R. 409: 307, 310; R. 406: 518.) Alvarez did not mention the problems 
with the Coon Group Contract. 
Marshall Larson ("Larson"), who became an agent for Fairboum August 1st, (R. 232, 
234), obtained an interested buyer in Rochelle Properties, LC ("Rochelle"), an affiliate under 
common control with Liberty Homes, Inc., a large Utah homebuilder, (R. 233). On August 6, 
1999, David C. Clark ("Clark"), manager of Rochelle, signed a letter of intent to purchase 
the Property for $23,000.00 per lot. (R. 409: Tr. 261; Ex. No. 1.) Clark was very interested 
4851-5789-7728.FA371.005 2 
in purchasing the Property, expecting it to be the West Jordan inventory for Liberty Homes 
and being convenient to two existing model homes. (R. 408: Tr. 261.) 
Fairbourn represented American in the transaction, and Larson represented Rochelle, 
under a "dual agency" arrangement. (R. 409: Tr. 315; Ex. No. 2.) After receipt of the letter 
of intent, a meeting occurred American's office, consisting of Alvarez, Fairbourn, Larson, 
Clark and Irv Gardner ("Gardner"), of Rochelle. (R. 233.) The parties discussed Rochelle's 
proposed purchase of the Property from American. Part of the discussion involved 
American's expectations of ability to perform. (R. 408: Tr. 56-57,60; R. 409:261-264,288-
291, 397-401.) According to Clark, Gardner, Fairbourn and Larsen, Alvarez said that he 
wanted some evidence of Rochelle's ability to perform. (R. 233; R. 409: Tr. 264, 289, 312, 
402.) No mention was made of any line of credit, cash on hand or firm bank commitment, 
which Alvarez testified he insisted on. (R. 408: Tr. 60; 409: Tr. 264, 291, 314, 404.) 
August 13, 1999, Fairbourn delivered to Alvarez a Single Party Listing and Sale 
Agreement and an offer from Rochelle, (R. 233), consisting of a standard form Real Estate 
Purchase Contract prepared by Larsen, together with an Addendum No. 1 prepared by 
Gardner, (R. 409: Tr. 313; Ex. No. 3). The Listing Agreement provided for payment to 
Fairbourn Commercial of a commission of $1,500.00 per lot if the Property was sold to 
Rochelle for $2,277,000.00 for an estimated 99 lots. (R. 233; Ex. No. 2.) Alvarez signed the 
Listing Agreement but subsequently rejected the offer. (R. 408: Tr. 62.) 
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August 16 , Rochelle presented another offer consisting of a form Real Estate 
Purchase Contract and an Addendum No. 1, prepared by Larson. (R. 233; R. 408: Tr. 63-64; 
R. 409:266-267; Ex. No. 4.) Alvarez prepared a counteroffer. In preparing the counteroffer, 
Alvarez specifically and in detail set out a number of paragraphs detailing the arrangement, 
including insertion of definitional and clarifying language. (R. 408: Tr. 67-73; Ex. No. 4.) 
One of the paragraphs, entitled "Financial Capability," stated: 
Within Fourteen days after execution of this Agreement by both parties, 
Buyer shall supply to Seller with evidence of financial capability to 
close on the Property within the time frame referenced above. In the 
event Buyer is unable to provide said evidence, Seller shall at its sole 
option cancel this Agreement and neither party shall have any further 
obligation to the other. 
(R. 233-234; Ex. No. 5.) 
The counteroffer also provided, inter alia, for a 21 day due diligence period, 
acloiowledged that American had given only limited information to Rochelle, and required 
a $50,000 earnest money deposit1, which would become non-refundable upon lapse of the 
due diligence period, it not being conditioned upon financing. (R. 408: Tr. 63-64; R. 406: 
531, Ex. No. 4.) After the short due diligence period, the $50,000 deposit would become 
non-refundable. Additionally, Rochelle's purchase of the Property was subject to all 
conditions affecting the Property, the existence of any environmental problems, and the 
1
 Alvarez acknowledged that neither he nor American had ever had as large as 
$50,000 earnest money deposit required in any prior transaction. (R. 408: Tr. 67, 68.) 
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shifting of the risk to Rochelle of any lack of City approval. (Ex. No. 4). Moreover, 
Rochelle was dependant upon American's good faith in continuing to work with the City in 
getting final approval, with no meaningful remedy if American did not comply with that 
obligation. (R. 406: Tr. 527.) 
Thereafter, a meeting occurred in American's office, involving Alvarez, Fairboum, 
Larson and Clark. Those individuals reviewed in detail the Agreement, including 
American's counteroffer. Included in the discussions was the "Financial Capability" clause, 
which had to be complied with in only fourteen days from the contract signing. (R. 234.) 
Alvarez told Clark that he wanted a letter from a bank showing a willingness to lend to 
Rochelle. (R. 409: Tr. 270.) 
By August 30th, only with initialed changes to a paragraph specifying time for closing, 
the Agreement, including American's counteroffer, was signed by both the seller and buyer. 
(R. 409: Tr. 317; Ex. No. 4.) Rochelle deposited the $50,000.00 earnest money with the 
escrow agent and undertook the efforts and payment of money for its formal due diligence. 
(R. 409: Tr. 319; Ex. No. 6; Ex. No. 7.) 
By the date the sale contract was signed, American had resolved its immediate time 
pressures regarding the Property. After the City had earlier rejected the zoning application, 
Alvarez and LaMar Coon had held a "closed door" meeting with some City councilmen. 
Alvarez received indication of the City's willingness to grant the zoning if Alvarez could 
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obtain an additional five or six acres of property for the project. (R. 408: Tr. 161-162.) In 
June or July 1999, American succeeded is obtaining rights to purchase that additional 
acreage. In addition, on August 23, 1999 (a week prior to the effective date ofthe Rochelle 
Contract), the LaMar Coon Contract was reinstated, extending its closing date to 
December 1, 1999. (Ex. No. 31.) 
Pursuant to the "financial capability" clause, Rochelle arranged for a letter from 
Cy Simon ("Simon"), construction loan officer of First Security Bank, to be delivered to 
American. (R. 235; R. 409: Tr. 234-235; Ex. No. 9.) Alvarez rejected that letter without 
explanation. Rochelle then arranged for a second letter from the Bank, dated September 17, 
2000, providing more detail as availability of credit lines, amounts of currents loans in place 
and painted a positive picture ofthe Bank's willingness to lend, with predictable, guarded 
bank rhetoric. (R. 236; R. 409: Tr. 235-238; Ex. No. 10.) 
Alvarez never inquired of Simon, never requested financial statements, and never 
requested any other information relating to Rochelle's financial status or ability to perform. 
September 21, 1999, Alvarez, by telephone, advised Fairbourn that he was rejecting the 
letters and terminating the contract. Alvarez then sent a notice of termination of the title 
company, arranging for the title company to return the $50,000.00 earnest money payment 
toRochelle. (Ex. No. 12.) Although Alvarez should have been aware ofthe ambiguity after 
receipt ofthe first letter from the bank, and the court determining that he therefore had an 
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obligation to clarify the ambiguity, Alvarez never gave any explanation before he unilaterally 
gave his notice of rejection. (R. 237.) The sole reason Alvarez has given for the rejection 
was the failure to comply with the Financial Capability clause. He acknowledged his 
understanding that the commission to Fairbourn was fully payable if the Rochelle Contract 
closed. (R. 408: Tr. 90.) 
By the time of American's cancellation of the Rochelle Contract, though, Alvarez was 
aware of opportunities for significantly greater profit if American were now to develop and 
sell the Property itself as "paper lots." (R. 409: Tr. 219-22.) Alvarez was also familiar with 
the status of property development in the area of the Property, including American's 
familiarity with Leon Peterson ("Peterson"), who was developing five acres of property 
adjacent to the Property and was seeking City application for approval at the same time as 
American was seeking approval for its Property. (R. 408: Tr. 108-109.) Alvarez was also 
familiar with other Peterson property transactions, October 13,1999, less than a month after 
Alvarez sent the notice terminating the Rochelle Contract, American received an offer from 
Peterson to purchase the Property. (R. 408: Tr. 127, Ex. No. 13.) October 26th, Alvarez 
presented a counteroffer, which, together with a letter of final modification created a final 
contract of sale to KFP Corporation (the "Peterson Contract"). (Ex. No. 14.) 
Alvarez told Fairboum, subsequent to and despite the signing of the Peterson 
Contract, that American intended to keep and develop the Property itself. (R. 409: 
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Tr. 325-27.) Although neither Rochelle nor Fairbourn had advised or threatened American 
with any claim or problem as to the language of the Rochelle Contract "financial capability" 
language, (R. 408: Tr. 129-130), American, in its counteroffer to the Peterson Contract, had 
included a "financial capability" paragraph similar to the Rochelle Contract language, but 
which expanded the language to read as follows: 
Within Fourteen days after execution of this Agreement by both parties, 
Buyer shall deliver to Seller evidence of financial capability to close on 
the Property within the time frame referenced above. In the event 
Buyer is unable to provide evidence acceptable to Seller in Seller's sole 
discretion. Seller shall at its sole option cancel this Agreement. Escrow 
Agent shall return the Deposit to Buyer and neither party shall have any 
further obligation to the other, (emphasis added) 
Despite the language in the counteroffer in the Peterson Contract, Alvarez never 
sought any financial statements, never did any credit investigations, and did not initiate any 
inquiries of any nature to verify the financial ability of KFP or Leon Peterson to perform 
under the Peterson Contract. (R. 408: Tr. 138.) By accident, Alvarez received a telephone 
call from a loan broker for Peterson. (R. 408: Tr. 139.) During the call, discussion occurred 
about the credit circumstances and willingness to loan under the Peterson Contract. (R. 408: 
Tr. 139-140.) There followed a fax from the broker to Alvarez indicating no anticipated 
problems in making a loan but emphasizing that the loan had not been submitted nor 
approved and that the letter constituted no commitment to the borrower. (R. 408: Tr. 140-
141; Ex. No. 17.) 
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The zoning approval for the Property was finally approved by West Jordan City in 
January 2000. The closing and settlement of the Peterson Contract occurred January 19, 
2000, with American having previously assigned its interest to Midas Creek Estates, LLC. 
(R. 408: Tr. 155-156.) Included with the closing was a note for $31,000.00 payable from 
KFP Corporation secured by a trust deed, instead of being entirely a cash closing. (Ex. No. 
24; Ex. No. 25; Ex. No. 26; Ex. No. 27.) 
The net bottom-line profit to American, by selling to Peterson for a higher purchase 
price, and attempting to eliminate the commission to Fairbourn, was $266,000.00. (R. 408: 
Tr. 153-154.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. American has failed to marshal fully the evidence in favor of the trial 
court's findings and judgment. Because of this lack of compliance, American is precluded 
from challenging the trial court's determinations and rulings. 
2. The trial court, as the finder of fact, is the true determiner of the weight 
and credibility of the evidence and testimony of witnesses. For this reason, the trial court's 
factual determinations and the rulings resulting therefrom, after a three-day trial, should be 
upheld. 
3. The trial court correctly found the Financial Capability clause language 
requiring "evidence of financial capability to close" was ambiguous and that Rochelle 
reasonably and correctly interpreted and applied it. The trial court noted the credibility of 
David Clark's testimony, recognized the shared experience and sophistication of the parties 
to the Rochelle contract, and held that Alvarez could have, but did not, clarify his 
interpretation of the language to remedy any misapprehension. 
4. The trial court, having correctly determined that the disputed contract 
language was ambiguous, appropriately applied the general rule of contract interpretation to 
construe against American the ambiguous contract language drafted by Alvarez. 
5. Fairbourn Commercial took all required actions to earn the commission 
by finding Rochelle as the buyer and effectuating the sale of American's property under the 
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Rochelle Contract. American cannot avoid its obligation to pay the commission by the 
failure of the Rochelle Contract to close as a result of American's wrongful termination of 
the Rochelle Contract. 
6. Inherent in its transactions with Fairbourn Commercial and with 
Rochelle was American's covenant of good faith and fair dealing, including circumstances 
in which a party claims discretionary rights under a contract. American breached both the 
Rochelle Contract and the Listing Agreement with Fairbourn Commercial by cancelling the 
Rochelle Contract without cause. 
ARGUMENT 
A. AMERICAN HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE 
COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS AND, THUS, THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT 
MAY NOT BE DISTURBED 
All of the trial court's factual findings must remain undisturbed in this appeal since 
Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence in favor of the Court's findings prior to setting 
forth its arguments claiming those findings are erroneous. That is a necessary initial step in 
challenging the trial court's factual determinations. An appealing party is obligated to 
marshal all of the evidence supporting the trial court's verdict and then prove that such 
evidence cannot support the verdict. Water & Energy Sys. Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32, 
H 15,48 P.3d 888; AX. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 1999 UT App 
87, ^ 26, 977 P.2d 518, cert denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999). If the appealing party fails 
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to marshal all of the evidence, it is assumed that the evidence sufficiently supported the 
findings of the trial court and the appealing party's claim of insufficiency also fails. Id. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT ROCHELLE HAD 
COMPLIED WITH ITS CONTRACT 
1, The Trial Court's Analysis of the Evidence and the Credibility of 
Witnesses is Controlling, 
American's obligation to marshal all of the evidence is required in light of 
"general deference toward the jury's role as fact-finder" and the recognition of the 
advantaged position of trial courts to "evaluate the evidence and determine the facts." Keil, 
2002 UT at Tf 15 (citations omitted). Because of the trial court's advantaged position, a fact 
determination by the trial court deserves a "fair degree of deference" due to the fact that the 
trial judge has observed the facts, including the "witness's appearance and demeanor, 
relevant to the application of the law that cannot be adequately reflected" in the appellate 
record. Department of Human Servs. ex rel Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 681 (Utah 
1997) (citations omitted). As such, a trial court's findings of fact are upheld unless the 
evidence supporting them is sufficiently lacking that the appellate court may conclude that 
the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 
1998), cert, denied, 526 U.S. 1130 (1990). 
Following a three-day trial during which the trial court heard testimony, 
determined the credibility of witnesses, and reviewed all of the evidence, the court ruled in 
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favor of the Appellee with respect to the issues on appeal. A principal issue for the court's 
finding was the nature and interpretation of a "financial capability" clause in the contract in 
dispute. This analysis included the determination as to testimony involving the parties' 
conversations and interpretations regarding this clause and the context in which it was 
negotiated and applied. The trial court, among its other findings, expressly rejected 
testimony of Appellant's witness as to what he supposedly said at the meetings. (R. 235.) 
Further, the court gave credibility to Appellee's witnesses concerning these conversations 
and the parties' interpretation of the applicable language. (R. 234-235.) The trial court also 
had considerable evidence and testimony regarding the circumstances following the 
Appellant's notice terminating the contract, which supports the findings of the court 
regarding the contract provision at issue. 
The trial court in this case was in an advantaged position to observe the facts 
and witnesses, and to then evaluate the evidence and determine the facts. The trial court's 
findings of fact are entitled to deference. Because the trial court's findings of fact are 
supported by sufficient evidence, its decision was not clearly erroneous, and therefore, its 
findings of fact must be upheld. 
2. The Trial Court Appropriately Interpreted the Financial 
Capability Clause Against American, 
The language of the Financial Capability clause at issue, drafted by Alvarez, 
required Rochelle to supply "evidence of financial ability to close on the property within the 
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time frame referenced above [14 days]." American claims that this clause, absent more 
specific language, unambiguously required a binding loan commitment, letter of credit, or 
availability of cash. American further urges that American had the unilateral right to 
terminate the contract if Rochelle did not provide evidence of one of those unspecified 
requirements. In support of American's interpretation, Alvarez testified that he specified 
these requirements at two separate meetings with other witnesses discussing the contract 
requirements. (R. 408: Tr. 56-60, 89, 102.) 
American's position is untenable. The trial court expressly rejected Alvarez's 
testimony on this point and accepted the contrary testimony, expressly finding that Alvarez 
made no such explanation. (R. 235.) The other witnesses, particularly Clark, whose 
credibility the Court specifically noted, testified that Alvarez, in two separate meetings in 
which that language was discussed, asked only for "a letter from a lender that states that more 
than likely you'll be creditworthy. . . . " (R. 409: Tr. 270.) Indeed, the Court specifically 
found the following: 
. . . I do not find that Mr. Alvarez expressed to anyone at anytime his 
intention that only a binding loan commitment or letter of credit would 
satisfy his definition of adequate financial capability. The participants 
in this transaction shared considerable experience and sophistication in 
real estate development and financing. I credit the observation made 
by David Clark, the owner of Liberty Homes who negotiated on behalf 
of Rochelle, that he would have taken note of a demand that the 
evidence be in the form of proof of available cash, a load commitment, 
or letter or credit because none of this evidence could have been 
obtained from a bank within the 14 days allotted for its production. 
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The letter, which Mr. Simon prepared for American on behalf of 
Rochelle, stated, "I would not expect having difficulty making 
acquisition and development loans [to Rochelle] in the future, barring 
something unforeseen in the economy. 
(R. 235). 
The Court described this clause, in the context of "shared . . . experience and 
sophistication" of the parties, as referencing "credit lines held by Liberty and Rochelle and, 
while making allowance for predictable guarded banker rhetoric, painted a positive picture 
of Rochelle's financial strength." The Court also stated: 
The extrinsic evidence relating to the Financial Capability clause yields 
the conclusion that Rochelle reasonably interpreted the clause in a manner 
consistent with paragraph 7.2 of the Purchase Contract to the extent that it 
required evidence that First Security Bank make a commitment to loan 
Rochelle money "subject only to changes of conditions in the Buyer's credit 
worthiness and to normal loan closing procedures. 
(R. 236). 
The Court further pointed out that, not only did Alvarez not communicate to 
Jim Fairbourn or to Rochelle any details of his expectation of the language's meaning, he had 
"ample opportunity" to know how Rochelle interpreted it and could have remedied any 
misapprehension. But "[h]e nevertheless declined to provide any meaningful clarification 
of his interpretation for the benefit of Rochelle." (R. 235). American did not clarify its 
demands, seek further verification from the bank, or otherwise attempt to close a deal with 
Rochelle, which clearly had the ability to provide the full payment at closing. (R. 235.) 
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A second problem American faces is American' s urging the court that Alvarez 
did in fact specify the nature of what "evidence" he wanted, including cash on hand, letter 
of credit or firm bank commitment. In trying to rely on Alvarez's testimony as to what the 
clause meant, American tacitly acknowledges that the Financial Capability clause is not clear 
without explanation and does not otherwise support American's interpretation which Alvarez 
said was "crystal clear." (R. 406: Tr. 535.) 
Assuming, ad arguendo, that the trial court were to have found the clause 
unambiguous, American still would not be benefitted. Indeed, the clause simply requires 
"evidence of financial ability." Without question, Rochelle provided "evidence" in the form 
of two separate letters from the bank. Hence, if the clause were indeed unambiguous, 
Rochelle clearly complied with its condition. 
Any interpretation of this contract provision contrary to its express language 
depends upon credibility of testimony of the parties attending the meetings, including non-
parties to this action. In making this determination, this Court did not, and cannot be 
expected to, suspend reality and to ignore common sense. In context of the undisputed 
testimony in this case, the court found Alvarez's position as not being credible. Given the 
importance Clark placed on getting these lots for Liberty Homes' Spring inventory, (R. 408: 
Tr. 261), the court found it not credible to expect that Rochelle would have jeopardized the 
contract by ignoring what Alvarez alleged was, from the beginning, a clearly understood and 
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presented requirement of a letter of credit or other binding ability to close. Rochelle was 
under a short term period for due diligence, was expending money for that purpose, and was 
trying vigorously to comply with the contract obligations. The court found no credibility to 
the assumption that Rochelle, being so much under due diligence time restraints, would take 
lightly such a requirement allegedly so strongly emphasized by Alvarez. Further, the court 
found it not credible that the Rochelle people, highly experienced in property development 
and bank lending, would have accepted language requiring an impossible condition of letters 
of credit or other "enforceable commitment," because banking business is not done that way. 
(R. 235). Even Alvarez had no recollection that either he or American had ever had a bank 
make that type of commitment on a yet-unsubdivided property. (R. 408: Tr. 99.) It is more 
credible that American, aware of significantly greater profit opportunities, sought a 
convenient way out. 
The language in question is not the result of someone who cannot draft clearly. 
It is illustrative to compare the language and precision of the Financial Capability clause with 
the language of remainder of American's counteroffer, all drafted by Alvarez at the same 
time. Scrutiny of the counteroffer, paragraph by paragraph, shows that Alvarez carefully and 
specifically crafted the language of each paragraph to avoid ambiguity, including careful 
insertion of definitional terms. (R. 408: Tr. 67-73; Ex. No. 4.) Given the specificity of that 
language, and the evidence of Alvarez's clear drafting ability, if Alvarez had intended to 
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require a letter of credit, current cash on hand or a bank's binding commitment, he not only 
could, but would, have said so. 
The Court found that Financial Capability clause ambiguous because it "gives 
no guidance to either the quantity or quality of evidence" required. Furthermore, in obvious 
reference to Mr. Alvarez's drafting ability, the Court pointed out that this clause lacked the 
precision of "absolute assurance" language in paragraph 7.2 of the Purchase Contract, for 
which Alvarez insisted he was preparing a substitute. (R. 236.) 
Sufficient evidence was presented to the Court as to why Alvarez would have 
no interest in clarifying such interpretation to permit closing of the Rochelle Contract. 
American, prior to and during negotiation of the Rochelle Contract, had been faced with both 
the city's rejection of the property zoning and the termination of the Coon Group Contract. 
By the end of the 14-day period specified in the Financial Capability clause, American had 
brought under contract an additional five acre parcel which, according to the "closed door" 
meeting with city council members, provided a comfort level of City approval, which indeed 
was finalized the following January. (R. 408: Tr. 161-162.) Moreover, the Coon Group 
Contract had been reinstated, with a closing date extended to December 1st. (Ex. No. 31.) 
Finally, with the pressure lightened, opportunity for significantly greater profits if American 
were now to develop and sell the lots (R. 409: Tr. 219-222), additional familiarity with 
Leon Peterson, and further ability to examine the market, it was to American's financial 
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advantage to rid itself of the Rochelle Contract and either to develop and sell the paper lots 
itself or to enter into a new contract. Indeed, after all costs and fees, sale under the Peterson 
contract netted American $266,000 more than the Rochelle Contract would have. (R. 408: 
Tr. 153-154.) 
It helps to further examine Alvarez's own interpretation of the disputed 
language by seeing how he later applied similar "financial capability" language in the 
Peterson Contract. The Rochelle Contract contained no language granting American the 
unfettered right to determine what is satisfactory "evidence" of Rochelle's financial 
capability. Shortly after the "termination" of the Rochelle Contract, though, American 
inserted a "financial capability" clause in the Peterson Contract similar to the Rochelle 
Contract language but adding discretionary language as follows: "In the event Buyer is 
unable to provide evidence acceptable to Seller in Seller's sole discretion, Seller shall at its 
sole option cancel this Agreement." (Emphasis Supplied.) (Ex. No. 14.) This addition, 
drafted by Alvarez, without American facing any threats or pressure from Rochelle or 
Fairbourn Commercial, tacitly acknowledged the ambiguity in the Rochelle Contract and 
recognized that the Rochelle Contract lacked the discretionary language to make American 
the sole determiner of the sufficiency of the financial evidence. 
Furthermore, even after inserting discretionary language in the Peterson 
Contract, it is significant that Alvarez did not even bother to check Peterson's or KFP's 
4851-5789-7728 FA37I 005 1 9 
credit. Instead, Alvarez was supposedly satisfied with a conditional letter, not precipitated 
by Peterson or American, being far weaker and more conditional than the letters Rochelle 
had previously provided from First Security Bank2. Indeed, even with expressed discretion, 
Alvarez clearly intended and interpreted the contract language not to require more—or as 
much—evidence as Rochelle provided. The Defendants' breach on the Rochelle Contract 
was not precipitated from concerns about Rochelle's financial ability but, rather, from an 
opportunity to net substantial profits through the Rochelle Contract "termination." 
2This Peterson lender "assurance" states: 
Armando, 
This is to confirm that KFP Corporation has requested a loan for the project 
known as West Jordan Meadows or Wood Creek 9 & 10. The loan will be for 
approximately $3,575,000 which will provide some funds towards the 
purchase of the land, lot improvements, and soft costs. This size loan is within 
[the lender's] informal limit to this borrower and within the borrower's 
financial capacity. The loan structure contemplated is within our underwriting 
guidelines and I do not foresee any problems during the approval process. 
The loan is not yet approved and there is no commitment to the borrower. We 
anticipate submitting the loan for approval either the week of November 22nd 
or the week of November 29th. 
Please call me if you have any questions. 
(Ex. No. 17.) 
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American further argues that, regardless of the letters from First Security Bank 
and the Court's recognition of the commercial reasonableness of Rochelle's interpretation 
of the transaction between "experienced developers," (R. 237), Rochelle was not a "ready, 
willing and able" buyer, particularly that Rochelle was not "able" to purchase. The 
Defendants rely upon Winkelman v. Allen, 519 P.2d 1377 (Kan. 1974), and on Shell Oil 
Co. v. Kapler, 50 N.W.2d 707 (Minn. 1951), for the proposition that "the purchaser cannot 
show ability by depending upon third persons in no way bound to furnish the funds." 
However, Shell, cited with approval by Winkelman, states: 
Rules for testing a purchaser's financial ability to buy are not to 
be reduced to any unyielding formula, but must be flexible enough to 
accomplish their purpose according to the particular facts of each case. 
In ascertaining the rules reflected by an endless variety of cases, it is 
particularly important to bear in mind that no decision is authoritative 
beyond the scope of its controlling facts. Difficulty in both stating and 
applying the rules stems principally from a failure to keep in mind that 
their purpose—the protection of good-faith sellers as well as of bona 
fide purchasers, brokers and other persons similarly situated—is to 
establish a purchaser's financial ability to buy with reasonable 
certainty. A purchaser may not have the necessary cash in hand, but 
that alone, it is recognized, does not disqualify him if he is otherwise 
so situated that he is reasonably able to command the requisite cash at 
the required time. On the other hand, the seller is not required to part 
with his property to a purchaser whose financial ability rests upon 
nothing more than shoestring speculation or upon attractive 
probabilities which fall short of reasonable certainty. In short, the rules 
are designed to protect the seller by binding him to a sale only where 
there is a reasonable certainty of the purchaser's financial ability to pay 
and, on the other hand, to protect the purchaser—and persons similarly 
situated—from a technical, insubstantial, or sharp-dealing 
disqualification. 
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50N.W.2dat712. 
Shell clearly is not a sterling case for American's reliance, not only because of 
the above-quoted language, but because Shell involved a purchaser who had only $100 and 
no other assets and clearly was not "ready" or "able" to purchase. Id, at 713. 
Winkelman might give stronger support to the Defendants' argument-if the 
Court were looking only at the contract language and not at the other testimony and evidence 
which the trial court accepted in interpreting the meaning of the Financial Capability 
language. But, even at best, the court's position in Winkelman is clearly the minority 
position. 
Only a few courts have taken the position that a purchaser of real 
property is required to have the cash in hand to make the purchase in 
order to be considered financially able. Most of the courts have taken 
the contrary position, although several courts have recognized that 
possession of funds sufficient for the purchase of the property 
necessarily establishes financial ability to buy the property. In addition, 
the courts espousing the latter view have found that financial ability is 
indicated by possession of assets which will permit the purchase to take 
place. However, one court has stated that such possession is 
insufficient if a cash purchaser is required and the duration of time it 
will take to convert the assets into cash is uncertain. 
What Constitutes Financial Ability to Perform Within Rule Entitling Broker to Commission 
for Producing Ready, Willing, andAble Purchaser ofReal Property, 87 A.L.R.4th21 (1991) 
(citations omitted). 
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Generally, the courts, including Shell, relied on by the Defendant, hold that 
resolution of the meaning of the term "financial ability" in individual cases depends upon the 
facts of those cases. In the context of a broker claiming a commission when a contract did 
not close, the majority of courts have held that where the purchaser had the ability to obtain 
a loan for the requisite amount, even though the loan was not obtained, that the purchaser 
was still able to complete the purchase and the broker was entitled to a commission. See, 
e.g., Stichtv. Shall, 543 So.2d395 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4thDist. 1989); Telanderv. Posejpal, 
418 N.E.2d 444 (111. App. Ct. 2d Dist 1981); Scott v. Cravaack 372 N.E.2d 1375 (Ohio Ct. 
App., Hamilton County 1977); Record Realty, Inc. v. Hull, 552 P.2d 191 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1976); Peter M. Chalik & Assoc, v. Hermes, 201 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. 1972). 
The trial court in this case resolved the factual issues through its examination 
of the evidence and the determination of witness credibility. The simple conclusion is that 
the Court determined that Rochelle complied with the Rochelle Contract, but American did 
not. 
3. When Contract Language is Determined to be Ambiguous, it Must 
be Interpreted Most Strongly Against American, the Drafter of the 
Ambiguous Provision, 
In the trial court proceeding, Alvarez argued that the Court should construe the 
clear language of the "financial capability" clause he drafted to include arbitrary and 
discretionary authority for American to determine compliance with that section. The trial 
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court rejected the argument, determining that because the language was ambiguous, "the 
general rule of contract interpretation [is] that ambiguous language is to be construed against 
the drafter." Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366,1372 (Utah 
1996). The rule of construction should be applied where the contractual language is unclear 
and susceptible to more than one interpretation. Bryant v. Deseret News Pub. Co., 
120 Utah 241,233 P.2d 355, 356 (1951). The Court applied this rule of construction—that 
doubtful, ambiguous contractual terms in a contract should be interpreted against the 
drafter—to determine the parties' intent. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that ambiguities in contracts are 
construed against the drafter where there is genuine ambiguity or uncertainty in the language 
"upon which reasonable minds may differ as to the meaning." Camp v. Deseret Mut. Benefit 
Ass'n, 589 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1979) (citing Auto Lease Co. v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 
7 Utah 2d 336, 325 P.2d 264 (1958)). The Camp Court said: 
That requirement is not satisfied because a party may get a different 
meaning by placing a force or strained construction on it in accordance 
with his interest. The test to be applied is: would the meaning be plain 
to a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding, viewing the 
matter fairly and reasonably, in accordance with the usual and natural 
meaning of the words, and in the light of existing circumstances, 
including the purpose of the policy. If so, the special rule of 
construction is obviously unnecessary. 
Id.; United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 1993). 
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The trial court, therefore, applied the applicable law by first finding that the 
contract language was ambiguous and susceptible to more than one meaning and then, in the 
interpretation, construing the language against the drafter. 
C. WHEN BOTH PARTIES SIGNED THE ROCHELLE CONTRACT, FAIRBOURN HAD 
SATISFIED THE CONDITIONS TO EARN ITS COMMISSION 
No issue exists that upon the closing of the Rochelle Contract, which the Court found 
American had wrongfully terminated, Fairbourn Commercial would have been entitled to 
payment of its commission. (R. 408; Tr. 90.) Indeed, the Appellant acknowledges that. The 
Appellant, though, sets forth the imaginative argument that, since the Listing Agreement 
provides for payment of the commission at closing, American somehow defeated the 
commission claim when it terminated the Rochelle Contract and prevented the closing 
thereof. 
Even if Rochelle had not complied with the provisions of the "financial capability" 
clause of the contract (which, of course, Rochelle complied with), Fairbourn still would be 
entitled to a commission from American. The general rule in Utah is that, without a contract 
provision that conditions the right to a commission upon the buyer's performance, an agent 
earns a commission upon procuring a buyer who is willing and able, and accepted by the 
seller. In Bushnell Real Estate v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah 1983), the Court stated: 
. . . Absent a contractual provision, which conditions the right to a 
commission on the performance of the buyer, the general rule accepted 
in Utah is that a broker has earned his commission upon the procuring 
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of a buyer who is ready, willing and able, and who is accepted by the 
seller. The broker is not an insurer of the subsequent performance of 
the contract and is not deprived of his right to a commission by the 
failure or refusal of the buyer to perform. See e.g., F.M.A. Financial 
Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965). This is the 
rule followed in a majority of jurisdictions. The defendants cite 
Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843 (N.J. 1967), as 
authority for the proposition that notwithstanding the clarity of the 
documents in imposing an unconditional liability for broker's fees there 
should be an implied condition in the note setting up a waiver of fees 
if the buyer defaults before completion of the transaction. This is a 
minority rule contrary to the decision in F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. 
Build, Inc., and is factually distinguishable in that the Ellsworth Dobbs 
decision involved inequality of bargaining power. In the instant case, 
the parties dealt voluntarily and in a commercial setting. . . . 
American claims that it does not owe Fairbourn a commission because American did 
not proceed to close on the purchase contract. However, the sole reason the closing did not 
occur was because American's breach of both its Listing Agreement with Fairbourn and its 
Real Estate Purchase Contract with Rochelle. "[A] party who commits the first breach of 
contract cannot maintain an action against the other for a subsequent failure to perform." 
Lynch v. MacDonald, 12 Utah 2d 427,367 P.2d 464,469 (1962). American cannot point to 
the fact that closing did not occur in order to relieve itself of liability for failing to pay 
Fairbourn its entitled commission when the sole reason closing did not occur was because 
of American's own breach of the Rochelle Agreement. But for American's breach, 
American would have sold the property to Rochelle. 
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D. AMERICAN BREACHED THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
INHERENT IN THE BOTH THE ROCHELLE CONTRACT AND, THEREFORE, IN THE 
LISTING AGREEMENT 
Inherent in the Rochelle transaction, as well as the Listing Agreement, is the 
requirement that American deal fairly and in good faith. Utah law recognizes the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract. See Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc. 
812 P.2d49,55-56 (Utah \99\)\Beckv. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d795,798 (Utah 1985). 
"Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each party impliedly promises that he will 
not intentionally or purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the other party's right 
to receive the fruits of the contract." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 
811 P.2d 194,199 (Utah 1991) (citing Bastian v. Cedar Hills Inv. &Land Co., 632 P.2d 818, 
821 (Utah 1981)). To comply with the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, "a party's 
actions must be consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations 
of the other party." Id. at 200 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a 
(1981). To comply with the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a party's actions "must 
be consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the other 
party." Keith Jorgensen's, Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 2001 Utah App 128, % 22, 26 P.3d 
872 (citations omitted). In analyzing compliance, the contract language and the course of 
dealings between the parties should be considered to determine the parties' purpose, 
intentions, and expectations. Rawson v. Conover, 2001 UT 24, % 44, 20 P.3d 876. 
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American argues that its alleged discretion under the "financial capability" clause 
trumped such considerations. But a party's possession of discretionary rights itself creates 
an obligation and justifies scrutiny, under good faith and fair dealing principles, as to the 
manner of the exercise of the discretion. In Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's 
Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert denied, 899 
P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995) the Utah Court of Appeals held that parties who retain express power 
of discretion under a contract may exercise that power in such a way to breach the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. Since parties cannot reduce every understanding to an express 
contractual term, the Court recognized that circumstances arise where one party may exercise 
its contractual discretion in a way that denies the other party the reasonably expected benefit 
of the bargain. Indeed a party to a contract may exercise a retained contractual power in bad 
faith. Id. at 450, 451 (citing Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 
706 P.2d 1028,1037 (Utah 1985)); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293,311 
(Utah 1982); Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130, 138-39 (Utah Ct 
App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1992). Clearly, even if the "Financial 
Capability" clause contained express discretion, as is American's position, American cannot 
ignore the covenant of good faith and fair dealing through its exercise of such discretion. 
American breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by canceling the Rochelle 
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Contract without good cause and selling the Property to another party for considerably more 
profit and, in turn, attempting to avoid the legitimate claims of Fairbourn Commercial. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should give deference to the trial court's hearing of testimony, listening 
and determining credibility of witnesses, and the application of appropriate legal and ethical 
considerations. The trial court decision should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this \J day of September, 2002. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
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